This paper investigates the e¤ects of taxation on migration. It develops a stylized, two-country model to examine the impact of taxation on labor mobility. The theoretical prediction that taxation a¤ects migration decisions is supported by some empirical evidence for the ASEAN and APEC economies. Average tax rates are found to have a larger impact on migration choices than marginal rates. Moreover, the results suggest that educated migrants are more responsive to taxation than migrants with no education. Average tax rates are most important for migrants with secondary education, while marginal rates have a greater in ‡u-ence on the decisions of migrants with tertiary education than secondary educated migrants. The …nding that taxation a¤ects migration decisions, in particular of educated migrants, has important policy implications.
Introduction
Do taxes a¤ect people's migration decisions? This question will become an important policy issue in the wake of the global …nancial crisis as government de…cits and rising debt levels are putting upward pressure on taxation. Throughout history, people have moved from one region of the world to another and migration has been extensively studied. 1 But the literature to date has largely ignored the e¤ects of taxation on the spatial mobility of people. 2 This paper develops a stylized, two-country model to examine the impact of taxation on labor migration. Some supportive empirical evidence that taxation a¤ects migration choices is provided for the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Paci…c Economic Cooperation (APEC).
International migration has been rising rapidly since the 1960s (OECD, 2008 ). This trend is likely to continue as countries may increasingly rely on migrants to ease the economic and budgetary impact of declining and ageing populations. The movement of people between countries has important economic consequences for both receiving and origin countries (Coppel et al, 2001) . Inward migration raises the labor force size of receiving countries and tends to increase per capita output. For source countries, the out ‡ow of people reduces the number of workers and may change the composition of skills within the labor force. A fall in labor supply tends to lower per capita output.
The decline in output may be exacerbated further if mainly skilled workers emigrate and aggregate productivity falls. For developing countries, the out ‡ow of people could potentially have a positive impact on economic development and raise per capita output if remittances provide capital to source countries that otherwise would not be available.
People's decisions to move from one country to another are thought to be in ‡uenced by the after tax income they can earn. In this case, the e¤ective average tax rate, which measures the total income tax paid (net of government transfer payments) as a percent 1 See, for example, Ghatak and Levine (1996) , Hatton and Williamson (2002) , Hatton and Williamson (2005) and references therein. 2 An exception is Kleven et al (2010) , who analyze the impact of taxation on the international migration of top soccer players in Europe. of total income, is the relevant variable in ‡uencing choices. People may also consider prospective future earnings and the rate at which an additional dollar of income earned is taxed. In this case, migration decisions would be a¤ected by people's e¤ective marginal tax rate. Figure 1 plots the emigration rates for the ASEAN and APEC economies against total tax revenue as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The emigration rates are calculated using data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database on immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC). They are the number of migrants (de…ned as the number of home nationals living in OECD countries) as a percent of the home population. Total tax revenue as a percent of GDP is used as a proxy measure for the e¤ective average tax rate. Migrants with di¤erent education levels (no education, secondary education and tertiary education) are considered because the level of education has been found to in ‡uence people's decisions to migrate. Figure 1 suggests a positive relationship between emigration rates and total tax revenue; that is, economies with a larger tax burden tend to have a larger out ‡ow of people. It also seems to indicate that people with secondary and tertiary education are more responsive to taxes than people with no education, i.e. the trend lines …tted through the data are steeper for secondary and tertiary educated migrants than for migrants with no education.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the impact of taxation on labor migration in a stylized, two-country model. Section 3 provides some supportive empirical analysis that taxation a¤ects migration decisions for the ASEAN and APEC economies and the last section summarizes and concludes. The e¤ects of taxation on labor migration are then examined.
Overview of the model
There are four agents in the two countries: households, …rms, a government and a monetary authority. Households are mobile or immobile. Immobile households always remain in their home country, while mobile households may migrate to live and work in the other country. There are no costs incurred when moving. Both mobile and immobile households provide labor to …rms and consume. They own the …rms in the country they live in. Households also hold domestic bonds and foreign bonds that are issued by the rest of the world. To purchase consumption goods households must hold demand deposits.
Firms are monopolistic competitors. They produce output of consumption goods by hiring immobile and mobile labor. They also use commodity inputs, which they import at the beginning of each period from the rest of the world. At the end of each period, …rms pay dividends to households.
The government collects tax revenue on households' labor, dividend and interest income. It also imposes a goods and services or value added tax. The monetary authority has an explicit consumer price in ‡ation target that it maintains by adjusting the nominal rate of interest paid on domestic bonds.
Households 2.2.1 Mobile households
Mobile households, denoted by subscript m, are in…nitely lived and a typical mobile household values streams of consumption and leisure according to
where j = a; b denotes the country of residence of a mobile household. ; > 0 are parameters and m 2 (0; 1) is the mobile household's discount factor. E t is a conditional expectations operator with respect to information available at time t and C 
Each household consumes many goods, all of which are domestically produced. C j m;t is the quantity consumed in period t of an index of these goods with
, where C i m;t (i) denotes the mobile household's period t consumption of good i and j > 0 is the price elasticity of demand. 3 The price of consumption good i is given by P j t (i) and the aggregate price level, P j t , is an index
Households derive income from three sources. First, they earn income from supplying labor, N 
where the nominal exchange rate S j t measures the price of the rest of the world currency in units of country j's currency.
The mobile household's deposit-in-advance constraint is given by
It holds as an equality at an optimum if I j t > 0. Using equation (4) , the household's budget constraint can then be re-written in real terms as
The real wage is given byŴ in the rest of the world is given by t = P t =P t 1 1.
The mobile household's optimization problem consists of choosing fC 
and
Equation (6) shows that, at an optimum, mobile households'after tax labor income is a function of the income tax rate, j , and the GST rate, j GST . Moreover, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to the relative price of consumption; that is, the ratio of the e¤ective price of consumption and the after tax real wage rate. The e¤ective price of consumption is the sum of its market price (equal to unity) and the opportunity cost of having to hold demand deposits to purchase consumption goods, (1 j ) I j t . Further, in equilibrium after tax real rates of return from holding domestic and foreign bonds are equal (equation (7)).
Immobile households
Immobile households, denoted by subscript im, do not migrate but always remain in their home country. They are in…nitely lived and a typical immobile household values streams of consumption according to
where j = a; b denotes the immobile household's home country and im 2 (0; 1) is the immobile household's discount factor. Immobile households derive labor, dividend and interest income and must hold demand deposits to purchase consumption goods. Their budget constraint in real terms is given by
Immobile households'labor supply is assumed to be inelastic, i.e. they do not respond to tax rate changes. given by
Firms
where j m ; j im 2 (0; 1] are parameters and j < 1; that is, the marginal return to each input is diminishing. Z j t denotes aggregate productivity and the elasticity of substitution in production is given by 1= (1 j ).
Each …rm sells its output of good, Y j t (i), to households and the government. Firms also export to the rest of the world. 6 Aggregate exports, X j t , are a function of the real 5 Mobile and immobile households provide di¤erent types of labor and hence are modelled as separate production inputs. 6 With monopolistic competition in the goods market each …rm treats the price in domestic currency, P j t (i), of the good i it produces as a choice variable, while taking the domestic aggregate price level, P j t , the nominal exchange rate, S j t , and the foreign price level, P t , as given. Having chosen P j t (i), the …rm then produces the quantity of output demanded at that price. Firms may not price discriminate and the price of good i sold to foreign consumers (denominated in foreign currency) is given by P 
where j ; & j > 0 are the price and foreign demand elasticities of exports.
Each …rm chooses
to maximize pro…ts subject to its production function (10) and demand function,
where M C j t denotes the real marginal cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, all …rms charge the same relative price, hire the same labor and use the same commodity inputs. Their …rst-order conditions are thus given by
Equations (14) to (16) show that …rms sell their output of consumption goods at a mark-up over production costs and factor prices are below their marginal products. 
Government
The government collects taxes on households' income and consumption. It uses the revenue to purchase an index of consumption goods, G j t , from …rms. For simplicity, the government's budget constraint is assumed to balance in each period
i.e. there is no debt …nancing. 7 
Monetary authority
The monetary authority has an explicit consumer price in ‡ation target, j . To maintain this target it adjusts the nominal rate of interest paid on domestic bonds, I 
where j , j y > 0 are parameters and I j and Y j denote the steady state interest rate and long-run, full capacity output. 7 No debt …nancing implies thatB j m;t =B j im;t = 0 for all t. The assumption does not change the conclusions.
Market clearing and equilibrium conditions
The clearing conditions for the labor and goods markets are given by
where N m;t denotes the total labor supply of mobile households, which is …xed.
All households'bond holdings are assumed to be in the form of foreign securities and the foreign sector clearing condition is determined by
The current account and uncovered interest rate parity are given by
The real exchange rate evolves according to
and the sequences of foreign interest rates, prices, in ‡ation and foreign demand for country j's goods fI t ; P t ; t ; Y j t g are given to the small, open economy.
Parameterization of the model
A period in the model corresponds to one quarter. Details of the parameterization are contained in Appendix A1. Parameter values are chosen so that the steady state of the baseline model is broadly consistent with typical assumptions made in the literature.
The steady state equations are listed in Appendix A2.
Impact of taxation on labor migration
To examine the e¤ects of taxation on labor migration we consider two scenarios. In the …rst scenario, one of the countries lowers the income tax rate from 30 to 25 percent. In the second scenario, one of the countries lowers the GST rate from 15 to 10 percent.
Both tax rate changes are …nanced by adjusting government consumption. The results are contained in Tables 1 and 2 .
Baseline model
Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table 1 
Reduction in country b' s income tax rate
Columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 1 
Reduction in country b' s GST rate
Next, a decline in the GST rate is considered. Columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 2 and (3b).
The results show that the decline in taxation leads to outward migration of mobile households from country a to country b. The impact in both countries following the reduction in country b's GST rate is similar to the income tax rate reduction. But the magnitude of the e¤ects of a 5 percentage point decline in the GST rate is smaller than the impact of a 5 percentage point reduction in the income tax rate for two main reasons.
First, goods and services (value added) taxes are less distortionary than income taxes. This is because they do not alter decisions between current and future consumption, i.e.
savings and investment choices. 8 As a result, the economic gains from reducing the GST rate are smaller than those from lowering the income tax rate. Second, the bene…ts of a reduction in the GST rate are smaller than the same percentage point reduction in the income tax rate because the GST rate is lower than the income tax rate. The economic costs of taxation tend to rise with the tax rate. That is, the higher the tax rate the larger the distortionary impact of taxation and hence the larger the economic bene…ts of a reduction.
Overall, in country b mobile and immobile households'after tax income rises slightly due to increased output. Tax revenue and hence government consumption fall by 6.9 percent and household consumption increases by 4.7 percent following the reduction in the GST rate. In country a, the outward migration of mobile households leads to a decline in output, after tax income, household consumption, tax revenue and government consumption.
Empirical analysis
To test the theoretical prediction that taxation a¤ects migration decisions we use the OECD's DIOC database. Migrants with no education, secondary and tertiary education from the ASEAN and APEC economies to OECD countries are considered. 9 This section discusses the data and estimation and presents some results. 
Data and estimation
The migration database we use is a 23 28 matrix whose ij's cell gives the number of migrants from ASEAN or APEC economy i living in OECD country j around the year 2000. 10 Six countries are members of both APEC and the OECD which leads to a total sample size of 638 (= 23 28 6) observations. 11 Appendix B1 lists the economies and the data sources for the explanatory variables are given in Appendix B2.
To investigate the impact of taxation on migration the following equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
where y denotes the proportion of migrants from ASEAN or APEC economy i living in OECD country j, x is a vector of regressors, is a vector of parameters and " is a disturbance term. To evaluate the e¤ects of taxation for migrants with di¤erent levels of education, equation (27) Furthermore, we include the di¤erence between government expenditure on health and education as a percent of GDP in the home and migration country in the estimation. This is to capture that some government expenditure, e.g. on infrastructure, health, education, has been found to be "productive" and contributing to economic growth (Barro, 1990) . Taxation that …nances productive government spending may have less adverse disincentive e¤ects and may in fact reduce outward migration.
The tax variables chosen are total tax to GDP and the personal top marginal income tax rate plus the goods and services tax (GST) or value added tax (VAT) rate. Ideally e¤ective average and e¤ective marginal tax rates that take into account government transfer payments and the rate at which these payments are reduced as income rises would be used. But these rates are not readily available for non OECD countries. Total tax as a percent GDP is instead used as a proxy for the e¤ective average tax rate, while the personal top marginal income tax rate plus the GST/VAT rate is a proxy for the rate at which an additional dollar of labor income earned is taxed. Total tax to GDP and the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate are included separately in equation (27).
Estimation results
Equation (27) was estimated in GAUSS 6.0. The coe¢ cients of interest are those on the tax variables (total tax to GDP and the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate), while all other parameter estimates are nuisance parameters. Table 3 reports the estimation results for total tax as a percent of GDP, while Table 4 presents the …ndings for the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate. As the explanatory variables (except for distance to the equator and the two dummy variables)
are expressed in di¤erences of source minus receiving country, a positive parameter estimate on the tax variable means a positive relationship between taxation and outward migration. In other words, a positive estimate on total tax to GDP or the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate suggests that the higher tax burden, the larger out ‡ow of people.
12 Tables 3 and 4 show that the parameter estimates on both tax variables are positive,
i.e. taxation a¤ects migration decisions, with the coe¢ cient on total tax as a percent of GDP being larger than the coe¢ cient on the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate. The …nding of a larger coe¢ cient on total tax to GDP suggests that migrants are more responsive to average tax rates than marginal rates. That is, the total net tax paid as a percent of income has a greater in ‡uence than the rate at which an additional dollar of income earned is taxed.
The results also suggest that taxation has a larger impact on the location choices of educated migrants than for migrants with no education, i.e. the parameter estimates on both tax variables are larger for migrants with secondary and tertiary education than for migrants with no education. This …nding is in line with country evidence that people's responsiveness to taxation increases with income (Saez et al, 2009 ).
Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on total tax to GDP is larger for migrants with secondary education than for migrants with tertiary education, while for migrants with tertiary education the parameter estimate on the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate is higher than for migrants with secondary education. The …nding that migrants with secondary education are more responsive to e¤ective average tax rates may re ‡ect that lower and middle income people, in particular families with children, tend to receive larger government transfer payments than higher income people. These transfer payments can substantially reduce the net tax paid and hence the e¤ective average tax rate. The result that migrants with tertiary education are more responsive to marginal tax rates than less educated migrants may indicate that more educated migrants earn higher incomes and are hence more likely to be paying the personal top marginal income tax rate. Despite the non-normality in the errors, the parameter estimates are still expected to be unbiased but less con…dence should be placed on the test statistics.
Main …ndings
To summarize, four main …ndings arise from the empirical application. First, the empirical results support the theoretical prediction that taxation a¤ects migration decisions.
Second, average tax rates seem to have a larger impact than marginal rates. Third, educated migrants tend to be more responsive to taxation than migrants with no education.
Fourth, average tax rates seem to have a greater in ‡uence on the location choices of migrants with secondary education than tertiary educated migrants, while for tertiary educated migrants marginal rates are more important. These four …ndings are robust 13 Including the GST/VAT rate and the personal top marginal income tax rate separately leads to the following results. The GST/VAT rate is highly signi…cant for all three migrant groups with the coe¢ cient for tertiary (secondary) educated migrants exceeding that for migrants with secondary (no) education. The personal top marginal income tax rate is signi…cant for tertiary educated migrants at the 98 percent con…dence level, at 73 percent for secondary educated migrants and insigni…cant for migrants with no education.
to di¤erent speci…cation of the empirical model, discussed next.
Sensitivity analysis
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The results in Tables 3 and 4 deleted missing values of migration between economies i and j. Setting missing values to zero, instead of deleting them, lowered the parameter estimates on both tax variables for all three migrant groups. But our four main …ndings continued to hold.
We also estimated equation (27) without Germany. This was because Germany has a particularly large number of missing and extreme values. 16 The overall results were robust to excluding Germany. Excluding Germany lowered the parameter estimate on total tax to GDP but raised the coe¢ cient on the personal top marginal income tax plus GST/VAT rate. Setting missing values to zero rather than deleting them and excluding
Germany lowered the parameter estimates on both tax variables except for the coe¢ cient on total tax to GDP of migrants with tertiary education, which was marginally higher.
Finally, we included a dummy variable for the United States. In those estimations the disturbances were still not normally distributed but the R 2 was higher. Both tax variables and the three dummy variables (for colonizer, common colonizer and United States) were signi…cant for migrants with secondary and tertiary education. All other explanatory variables were insigni…cant at conventional levels -bearing in mind the non-normally distributed errors. For migrants with no education only the colonizer and US dummy variables and the interaction term of GDP per capita and population were signi…cant. 
Concluding remarks
Migration has been extensively studied in economics but the e¤ects of taxation on migration have largely been ignored. This paper attempted to …ll part of this gap. It investigated the impact of taxation on labor migration using a stylized, two-country model. The results showed that a reduction in taxation leads to outward migration of mobile workers from the higher tax country to the country with a lower tax burden.
The movement of people between the two countries had important macroeconomic consequences. The out ‡ow (in ‡ow) of migrants lowered (raised) output, after tax income and consumption in the source (receiving) country.
The theoretical prediction that taxation a¤ects migration decisions was supported by some empirical evidence for the ASEAN and APEC economies. The results from the empirical application also suggested that educated migrants are more responsive to taxation than migrants with no education. Overall, average tax rates tend to have a larger impact on location choices than marginal rates. That is, the total net tax paid as a percent of income is more important than the rate at which an additional dollar of income earned is taxed. Secondary educated migrants seem to be the most responsive to average tax rates. This may re ‡ect that lower and middle income people, in particular families with children, in some countries, receive substantial government transfer payments that lower their average e¤ective tax rate. Tertiary educated migrants tend to be more responsive to marginal tax rates than secondary educated migrants.
This may re ‡ect that higher educated migrants earn higher incomes and are hence more likely to be paying the personal top marginal income tax rate than less educated migrants. The empirical result that educated migrants are more responsive to taxation than migrants with no education suggests that macroeconomic models need to take into account the composition of skills within the labor force to assess the economic consequences of migration.
The …nding that taxation a¤ects migration decisions, in particular of educated mi-grants, has important policy implications. Government de…cits and rising debt levels in the wake of the global …nancial crisis are putting upward pressure on taxation. Higher tax rates would increase the economic costs of taxation and lower the productive capacity of economies. The decline in output and economic activity following higher tax rates would be exacerbated if higher rates were to accelerate the outward migration of people.
A Theoretical model The annual domestic steady state in ‡ation rate, j , is 2 percent. The income tax rate, j , is set to 30 percent and the steady state GST rate, j GST , is 15 percent. The steady state foreign in ‡ation rate, , and nominal bond rate, I , are assumed to be the same as for the two countries. The price and foreign demand elasticities of exports, j and & j , are equal to unity, while foreign demand is chosen to yield a steady state ratio of exports to output of 20 percent.
A.2 Steady state
The steady state model is solved in Mathematica 6.0 with Newton's method. A residual is calculated to ensure that the model "nearly" solves. The system of steady state equations for country j is given by Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Norway; Czech
